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監eyWords   
同盟，民主主義，米国  
douslyespeciallyaftertheattackson9／11．Thepo－  
1iticaldynamicsin the reglOn are difftrentfrom the  
Asia Pacific，but mar）y Ofthe concernS are Similar．  
Simi1arly，in theMiddle East，the US’choice ofalT  
lies has been debated．Willthe US maintainitsal1i－  
anceswithIsraeldespitestrongdisagreements？Does  
this alliance stillmeettheUS’domestic，globaland  
reglOnalgoals and strategies？Thefuture ofthese al－  
1ianCeS，their effbctiveness and stability were often  
questionedinthe1990’s．TheUS－Israelial1ianeeand  
the US－Japanal1iance seem at times to complicate  
ratherthan aid otherUS policiesin theirrespective  
reglOn．Oftenitseemsthatthesealliances clashwith  
OtherreglOnalpoliciesandinterests・Thesetwocases  
arechosenbecausetheyarebothreferredtoas’spe－  
Cial’，theirfuture having been doubted despltetheir  
importancein theirl・eg10nS and because both have   
lntroduction  
The US－Israeliand US－Japallalliances have o h  
lastedlong andenduredmany conflicts andchanges  
intheinternationalsystem and throughoutr m ined  
OVeral1stable．These two sets of allian s have been  
the focus ofmany separate s udies，eSPeCially since  
theendoftheColdWar．IntheAsiaP cific reglOn，  
much has been written about the new triangle；  
China，Japan and the US．One ofth  most debated  
topICSinthepastdecadehasbeen：Howwi11theUS  
balanceitsallianeewithJapanwi itsrelat onswith  
China？TheUS－Japanalliancehas hadcons a teco－  
nomicconflictswhichleftdoubtaboutits conti lulty  
andoverallstability．IntheMiddleEa t（ME）region，  
rnany cha11geS have occurred n thelastdecade，a d  
theUS’involvementinthereglOnh sgrowntrem n－  
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overcome many conflicts and continued to expand 
their cooperation．Iwish to explorethe reasons for  
their origins，durability and stability．and highlight  
thesimi1arities，fbrthenrsttime．Forthataim，Ihave  
developedatheoretjcalmodelwhichIwouldliketo  
presentinthisarticle．   
Thepurposeofthis paperis toprovide an expla－  
nation for America’s strategleS，POlicies andits raq  
tionalein choosingIsraelandJapan asallies at the  
levelofglobalanalysis．Theresearchalso extendsto  
PrOViding an explanation as to why these alliances  
are stable and willremainimportant fbr the USin  
thefuture，desplte reglOnalandeven globalchanges  
thatmayoccur．Thestudyaimsatanalyzlngtheseal－  
liances from the American perspective of choosing 
these countries as al】ies and then maintainlng these  
al1iancesforalongperiodoftime．Ⅰwishtoexplain  
Whythesecountries wereimportantto theUS as al－  
1ies，andwhy therelations notonly continuedfbr a  
longperiodoftime，butwerereasonably stable．The  
leadingresearchquestioninthe studyis：Whatare  
the decisive factorsinthe fbrmation，durability and  
Stabi）ityoftheUS－IsraelandtheUSqJapanalliances？   
Thetheorysuggestedhereisacombinationofthe  
analysisoftheinternationalsystemstruCtureeXPlain－  
1ngtheformation，andthe statelevelanalysIS Ofre－  
gimetypewhichwillhelpexplaindurabiliqTandsta－  
bility of theseal1iances．The hypothesis proposed  
hereisthatademocraticsuperpowerwillchooseal1i－  
ances with regionalpowers and that the stableand  
durable alliance will be with democratic regional 
POWerS．Theimportance of the democratic factor  
StemSfrom sharedinterests andvalues，andfacilitates  
OVerCOml－1g disagreements through simi1ar political  
PrOCeSSeSWhichemphasizedialogueandcooperation  





On  reg1011 lpowerin each reg10n．A superpower  
needs t  alignwi hatleast one，ifnotal1reglOnal  
POWerSin ally glVen reglOn，ifitwishes to continue  
itsworldwidestatus．Thisstudyfocusesonthesuper－  
POWer aStheinitiator of theal1iance．The common  
assertionisthat states create allianCein order to en－  
hancetheirsecmity ra＄areSPOnSetOathreat．The  
ideaofasharedexternalthreatglVeSaSimpleexpla－  
nation o alliance fbr 1ation；but as others have  
done，Isuggestt tthereareotherstrateglCinterests  
t keninto acco11ntWhen selectlngal1ies．Balance of  
POWer heory state  that nations choose an alliance  
eitherto ba ance agalnStthe strongestpowerin the  
syst m，OrtObandwago lwithit・Thisprovidesthe  
b sic rationale for the hypothesis；a great POWer  
Wishest al gnwithmiddlerankingpowersinorder  
to balance agalnStits adversary，thus preservlngltS  
StatuS．  
In nysystem，aSuPerPOWerWillwanttoforman  
a11i cewithac〔orsfromdifftrentreglOnS．Thisisfor  
reasons fholdingltS POSition andinterestsin each  




Sdesireorevenne dtoformallianceswithreglOnal  
POWerSi acute．Generally．asuperpoweraimsatpre－  
SerVlngthestatusqu andwillthusformdifftrental－  
1iances w th bo h status quo and revisionist states．  
Thi  web ofa11ianceswi11be formed with both key  
act rs andlesser nati ns n the core and other re－  
glOnS．Asm st eglO S aremultipolar subsystems，a  
SupelPOWerWill hooseatleastone，ifnotmore，re－  
glOnalpowers as allies．A superpowercan notgoit  
alone；itmusthave powerfu1allies to maintainits  
POSition globally・An alliance with another，nOn－  
threatenlng POWer Willfacilitateits reach and pre－   
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Serveits status within sub－SyStemS aS Wellasglob－  
こ111さ∫、   
Analliancewitha reglOnalpower with potential  
foraninternationalkeyrolecanhelpinfluenceorre－  
Strainthat reglOnalpowerfrom certai11aCtions and  
PrOVidemoreaccesstoinformationaboutitsinterests，  
polieiesandstrategleS・2Anal1ianceisalsoawayof  
SeCunng a reglOnalactors’loyaltyln reglOnaland  
globalaffairs，eSPeCially at a time of globalization．  
GainlngSOmeautOnOmyOfareglOnalpowerismore  
usefulthan autonomy ofless powerfu1nations・Se－  
CunngaCloseallylneaChreglOnWillprovidethesu－  
PerPOWerwithgreateraccessibility to thereglOn and  
means of maintainlngitsinterestsin the reglOn．  
Maintainlng Orderin the reglOn Willbe easier as  
Well；aSthesuperpowercanaskthereglOnalpower  
for assistance，Or aSkit to re免●ainfromintervenlng．  
Regionalpower can providethe basis and facilitate  
theachievementandsuccessofthegreatpower’sen－  
gagementinthereglOn．Alignments with key actors  
in those reglOnS are the best way to maximizeits  
bene負tsandrealizea11itsinterests．  
ItisimportanttonotethatideologylSnOttheim－  
POrtantforceir）eXPlaining allianceibrmation，yetit  
does play a considerable role・AsRusset stated，the  
rewards toanaCtOris greater when the coalitionis  
ideologicallyconlfbrtablethanwhenitis not・3walt  
alsonotesthat states are morelikelyto follow their  
ideologicalpreferences whenthey are already fairly  
secure・4ThisappliestothestudyofsuperPOWerS，aS  
theiraligrLmentSelectionisnotbasedontheiriImne－  
diate securityneeds．Thefocusofthis analysisison  
StruCturalincentivesfortheformationoftheallianCeS，  
butideologicalcompatibilityandotherdomesticrea－  
sons create a wider window of incentives for the 
Creation of the alliance．Therefbre，the democratic  
Characterofthesuperpowerisslgnificant・  
In sum，COmmOnthreat，balances ofpower．threat  
Orinteresttheories and system struCture PrOVide the  
basicexplanationforalliancebehavior．Thishypothe－  
Siswishestoenhanceandspecifytheseby addinga  
factorofregionalpowers．As willbe shown，align－  
m nt reglO alpowerscanincorporateareplyto  
threats of the system structure and facilitate main－  
tainmg ofinterests and preserve the globaland re－  
glOnalbalanceofpower．AnideoIoglCa11ysuitableal－  
ance willbe even easier to form，and thus willbe  
evenmorefrequent．Consequently，aSuPerPOWerWill  
Choose to alignwith atleast one reglOnalpowerin  
e chregion．   
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more stabl ，In other words，the democratic feature  
Wi11 thedominantfactorin slgnalingthe stability  
and durability of an alliance between a superpowlr 
andareg10nalpower・Heretoo，itwillbethesuper－  
POWer’ reasonsformaintalnlngthealliancethatwill  
b  ex mined・Th independentvariablesin this case  
aredemocrac ndtheasymmetricrelationsbetween  
the 11ies；the dependent variables are the stability  
anddurabilityofaglVenalliance．   
System changeis the vitalelementinthe model  
PrOPOS dhere・AsG・Snydernotes，de－alignmentina  
bipolar systemisirrational，aS the superpowers are  
SOlidly committed by their owninterests to defend  
theirall es．5snydercontendsthat sincethe security  
di emmainbip arsyst msisless severe，and since  
erisks of aban onment arelow，alliances can not  
COllaps  or change basica11y untilthe struCture  
chang s・6T us，aCCOrdingtotherealistschool，SyS－  
tem struCture alone can provide ample explanation  
forthedurabiliqT（andformation）oftheUS－Israeland  
USJapanal1iance・The puzzleisthen，What made  
h ealliancesandother（suchasNATO）coldWar  
－basedal1ianC S SurV ve the struCturalchanges that  
OeCurredin1990？Therehavebeenattemptstoclar－  
ify the persistence of Cold War alliances after the 
limination ofa m叫Or COmmOnthreat．Walt attrib－  
Lltes the endurance of th  alliances to the fact that 
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these alliances wel-e both a stabilizing force during 




indifftrentreglOnSisevenmoreacute fbrasuper－  
POWerin aunlPOlar system・Anotherexplanationis  
the US，emphasis on ensunngltS Credibility as an  
al1y，and therefore continuesits comitments to  
thesecountries・Inthisstudy・Iwouldliketopropose  
that the two sets ofal1iancesinthe case studies e文一  
amined wi11notpersistmerely as an example or a  
managerialtoolinthis era ofchanges．Den10Cratic  
COOPeration and shared values signalaneVen mOre  




terthe securitybenents ofthe allianceforthelesser  
POWer，Since most ofits seeunty galn COmeSfrom  
thelarger state・Sueh changeS Willalso not change  






metric alliances are both easier to hrmand to main＿  
tain・9Asymmetrybetweensuchpowersis apparent，  
butthis asynlmetryis notgreat，aSal1the countries  
in these case studies areidentined as powers・In  
these cases，and as Bennett found，the asymmetry  
Variablealonecannotbesufficientinexplainlngthe  
durability and stability ofthe a11iances．Surveylng  
reasons foral1iance durability，Walt finds that alli－  
ancesaremorelikelytopersistwhenthereisasym－  
metry ofpower、Whentheallies share simi1arpolitiq  
Calvaluesandwhentherelationshipishighlyinstitu－  
tionalized．1u   
Gaubatz adds thatliberaldemocracies are more  
1ikely to maintaintheiral1iance comitments over  
timethanarenon－1iberalstates・Hearguesthatshared  
no ms，nam ly cooperation and amlty，between de－  
mocraciesarecoupledwithgenerallygreaterstability  
inthe behavior ofdemocracies over time relative to  
thatofoth rstates・D mocraticgovernmentS areun－  
abl toshif［policyrapidlyinthefaceofstablepub－  
1ic pref rences，and the pnmacy oftheru1e oflaw  
andrespectforlegalcomitmentsinliberalsocieties  
leadtosmooth，regularizedleadershiptransitionsand  
institutionalstability whichlead to stableinterna－  
tion lcomitments．M eover，many democracies  
have commoninterests，Whichleaddemocratic states  
toprefertoal1ywithotherdemocracies．11Bennettre－  
afhs thatal1iancesinvoIvingliberalstates do ap－  
PeartOlastlongerthan alliancesinvoIvinglesslib－  
eralstates．1：Thus，fbrmerStudieshaveshowndemoc－  
r cycontributestoalliancedurability．   
Differentcharacteristicsofdemocracy arebrought  
as a basis to the claim that democracies make more 
St bleandenduringallies．Choiarguesthatdemocra－  
Cieswithop n，tranSPare tPOliticalsystem，CaTlmOre  
effect velypromote any kind ofcooperation・13choi  
quotes Keohane statlngthatstates which seekcoop－  
erati  with other states need not onlyinlもrmation  
about the other government’s resources and formal  
neg tiatingpo itions，butalsoknowledgeoftheirin－  
ternalevaluations ofthe situation，theirintentions，  
t eint nslty Ofthei preftrences，and their willing－  
ness to adhere to an agreement even in adverse fu- 
ture circumstances．Choiaddsthat democracies have  
greatercap clty hannon－democracies forcomnuni－  
Cations and accessibility，afact that enables an alli－  
ancetobemorestableandto astlonger・l‘1   
Durable alhances increase other areas of interac- 
tions b tween the a11ies．Sandler states that contem＿  
POrary allies e often drawn closerby sharing eco－  
nom clinkages，democratic prlnCiples and member－  
Shipin otherinternationalorganizations・15weitsman  
argu thatalliancesareformednotonlyforsecunty   
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arrangements but also to manage conflict among  
member states・16In periods ofpeacetime，She con－  
Cludes，alliancesfunction to manage COnflict among  
memberstates・17Thesecanexplainboththeduration  
Ofanallianceandtherelativestabilityofit．   
Different studies have shown that an alliance be－  
tweentwodemocracieshasproventobedurableand  
Stable due totheinherent struCture Oftheir policies  
and sharedinterests．Democracies are better able to  
COOPerateWithoneanotherandshareddemocraticinT  
StitutionsfacilitateachievlngCOmPrOmiseswhencon－  
flicts between the members ofthe alliance arise．The   
democratic featurealso makesit difBcult for a state  
toabandonthealignment．Moreover，interdependence  
gradually evoIves；eCOnOmic ties and constituency  
SuPPOrteXPandareasofcooperationandcommunica－  
tionandensurescontinulty andconsistency．Further－  
more，in times of conflict，anal1ianCe between de－  
mocraciescanbeusedasaconflictmanagementtool，   
Thus，any alliance between two asymmetric de－  
mocracies willprovetobe durable．The factorof  
SuPerPOWerand a reglOnalpower allianceisimpor－  
tantalso for realizing globalinterests ofthe great  
POWer．StrateglC SettlngS，POlicies andinterests are  
Vitalfactors fbra superpowerin chooslngltS allies．  
These can be realized better through allianCeS With  
reglOnalpowers．Puttogether，an alliance between a  
democratic superpower and a reg10nal democratic  
POWer Willprove to be durable and stable．It has  
been suggestedbyIR scholars that atheory ofalli－  
ancebehaviormustcombine factors within the state，  
notablydomesticpoliticalsupportandresourceavai1－  
ability，Withconsiderationsframed by theintema－  
tionalsystemwithinwhichalliancesareformed・18In  
thismodelofanalyzingsuperpoweralliancebehavior，  
Iaim to do just that－COmbine different factors and  
levelsofanalysISintoonedetailedanalytlCaltool．   
Thetwohypothesescombinedprovideanexplana－  
tionfortheformation，thestabilityandthedurability  
Ofa glVen alliance between a superpower and are－  
glOnalpower．The first hypothesis can only explain  
theformation ofanal1iance；the secondits durabil－  
1ty andstability alone．Only taken togethercan alli－  
nce behavio  of a superpower befu11y understood  
and explained．Theircombinationisimportantfor a  
broad analysis of the present case studies and other 
alliances．Thecombination oftwolevels ofanalysis，  
SyStem and state，isthus b tter払r explainlng mOre  
aspects of he alliance，SuCh as strateglCinterests，  
economiccooperation orconflictanddomestic pres－  
SureSSuCha theJ wishLobbywithintheUS．  
US－lsrael：The Formation ofthe A”iance   
In1948the state ofIsraelwas fbrmed and the  
United States w s quick to recognize the new state 
anddevelopdiplomaticrelationswithit．Studieshave  
shown that the role oftheJewish vote was the main  
reaso ねr the US’support for the brmation ofIs－  
rael．19Thisisthe basis知rtheideathat America，s  
“special”relati nship withIsraelis mostly based on  
thepoweroftheJewishvote，Jewishmoneyandpo－  
1iticalinfluencein US domestic politics・However，  
Safran  o her  effectively show that at no time  
duringthepre－1967periodwastheJewishinfluence  
and generalAmerican sympathy sumcient toinduce  
theAmericangovernmenttoformwithIsraelabilat－  
e alormultilateralformalal1iance．2一一Atthistime，the  
USsuppor edtheideaofaJewishstateandprovided  
economicaid，butdidnotprovideanymi1itaryaidor  
eveninternationalrhetoric support．The specialrela－  
tions evolved gradually and were apparent only 20 
yearsafterIsrael’sfbrmation，in1967，WhentheUS  
publicly supportedIsraeland becameits prominent  
amssupplier．  
Inthe ar1yye rs fIsrael’sexistence，theUSwas  
Pr OCCuPiedwithengaglngtheArabstatesintoare－  
glOnalalli ce，inthecontextoftheColdWar．Rela－  
tions wi lsraelwere aliability and were therefore  
Playeddown・TheUSdisapprovedofIsraelipolicies   
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andactionsinthereglOn and publicly exerted pres－  




鈷nse，butthese wereinsufncientforbroadcoopera－  
tionandformalrelations，   
Thefirstmqjorcrisisintheregionwasin1956．At  
thetime，theUS wasaggravatedbythejointBritish，  





ZationthatIsrael’s deterrent powermight be usefu1  
fbrpromotlngAmericaninterestsin the reglOn．The  
Suez Crisis，Otherinternalcrisisin Middle Eastem  
COuntries andintra－Arabrivalries werethought to  
ChangethebalanceofpowerinthereglOnandledto  
agradualshiftinAmericanpolicytowardthereglOn．  
andIsraelspecifical1y．In his study，Ben Zvieffec－  
tively shows that the secondEisenhower administra－  
tion marks a subtle butpro丘）und shiftin American  
POlicytowardIsrael．Mostanalystsandhistorianssee  
anrstchangewith Kennedy’s decisionto sellHawk  
anti－aircraftmissilestoIsraelin1962，andthe”spe－  
Cialrelationship”aswellestablishedpubliclyfollow－  
ingIsrael’s swi托victoryin the67’SixDay War．  
Butthe policy shift actually began underthe Eisen－  
hower administration，aSit gradual1y recognized  




POliticalsituationinLebanon appearedto be so un－  
Stable that the Eisenhower administration dispatched  
U．S．MarinestoBeirut．In］ightofthisinstability，Is－  
raelshoweditselfto be the sole stable pro－Western  
p州erinthereglOn▲21   
Beforethe1967WarAmericaninterestsintheME  
Were at Stake，aS Safrandescribes；“Ami1itary vic－  
toryねrNass rwouldhaveputhiminapositionto  
e tabli hhishegemonyintheMiddleEastandsweep  
itcleanofanyremainlngAmericanpositions，includ－  
1ngtheoilrichArab countries．EvenJuStaPOlitical  
Victory wouldhave placed Nasserin a strong posi－  
tion to venture a new conf王ontation withIsraellater  
On，andinthe meantime would have put himin a  
dangerously powerfu1positionin the entire Arab  
WOrld，tOthe detriment ofthe United States andthe  
benefitoftheSovietUnion・り22ItwasIsrael，sappar－  
en powerandreglOnalstatuswhichseemedtobene一  
員tUS’interests aS Safi’an continues；“Israel’s com－  
Ple  and swiftvictory within six days，aChieved  
th ou  h r own unaided forces，in many ways  
umedthe tabl s onthe Soviets andtheir clients．It  
WaStheUSwhowasnowinapositiontouseitscli，  
ent’ victorylnOrdertocheckandrollbacktheSo－  
Vi tpositionin the ME，tO PrOmOte a11eW Orderin  
theareathatprotectedandadvanceditsowninterests，  
and to useitsMiddle Eastposition as aleverage to  
influe cetheSoviets，behaviorintheglobalarena・H23   
T eSixDayWarestablished andinstitutionalized  
theUS－Israelialignm nt・Bytheendofthewar，Is－  
rael’sreglOnalmi1itary superionty was apparent and  
utilizlngthis statuscoincidedwithAmerica’s overal1  
r glOnalandglobalinterests．Moreover，丘omtheUS  
POintofview，therewasacleardangerfromtheSo－  
vietUr）ion；andyettheMiddleEastwas secondary  
inimportanCetOOth rareasofconflict，atthispolnt，  
Vi6tnam．Thus，1sraelappearedasapillarofstability  
inthe defense of Americanideologicalinterests・Z4  
The close US－Israelities were acknowledged and  
Strengthenedaf［erIsrael’sinfluenceinthereg10nWaS  
demonstra ed．The US becameIsrael’s main armS  
SuPPl erandm reover，Israelwas part ofAmerican  
StrateglCregionalarrangementsandpolicies．  
Insum，theUS－1sraelirelationsevoIvedinto anal－  
1iancegra血dly．Ⅰ紺guethattheUS choseIsraelas  
an ally fbrmany reasons，but the decisive one was   
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the benentsねrthe US fromIsrael’s power and  
Strengthinthe reglOn．Prior toIsrael’s show of  
Strengthin1956andthe crisesinIraq，Jordan and  
Lebanon，AmericanJewry，COmmOn Soviet threats，  
common interests and shared democratic values were 
insufficientbythemselvesto stimulateamorefavor－  
ableAmerican policy．It was only after the Eisen－  
howeradministrationbegantorecognizethestrateglC  
dimension and to appreciate how shaky other pro－  
WesterngOVen－rnentSin the reglOn aCtually were，  
thattheUS startedto adopt amoreexplicitlycoop－  
erativepolicytowardIsrael．Whiletheshifttowarda  




SixDayWarof1967intoavirtualalliance．＝5   
ChangesinthebalanceofpowerinthereglOn and  
actors，SuCh as Egypt’s strengthwereimportantin  
America’schangedMEpolicy．TheUShadfailedto  
bring Arab countries collectivelylntO SOme formOf  
associationwiththeWesterndefensesystem．王nstead  
Ofthispolicy，theUS soughttopreserveitsposition  
intheareaandcheckthespreadofSovietinfluence  
through a policy of stabilization and reglOnalbalL  
ancesofpower・ThusachangeintheglobalstrateglC  
Situation brought a changein orientation towardIs－  
rael・26AndbecauseIsraelwaspolitically stableand  
mi1itari1ypowerfu1，itcouldbeaparticularlyvaluable  




Onlymadethedecision to elaboratethe allianceeas－  
ier．butas thosedidnotchangefrom1948itisthe  
ShowofIsrael’sstrengththatwasthedecisivefactor．  
Pledwithintern tionaland reglOnalcircumstances  
ledtheUStosecureJapanasaWestemally．Iargue  
thatthe US ehoseJ pan as anal1y for various rea－  
SOnS，andJqpan’spo entialroleinthereg10nWaSan  
importantincentivefbrthealliance．Indeed，COmmOn  
threats，interests，theinternationaland regionalseト  
tlngSWerea11importantintheUS’choicetoforman  
alliance withJapan，yetthe key factor fbrthe US  
WaSJqpan’spotentialreg10nalroleandpower．   
The US’decision to use atomic bombs onJapan  
derivedmainly蝕・Om adesire to endthe war．to en－  
SureitsdominanceintheOccupationandadesireto  
Shapethepost－WarAsianreglOnPOliticallyandeco－  
nomica11yto sui Amehcaninterests．TheUS had to  
COntrOl he Occupationinorder to containJapan’s  
POtentialpowersoitwouldnotagainbethreatenlng  
forceandwouldthus belikelytoutilizeJapan’slo－  
Cationa di ustrialcapabilitiesforAmerica’sbene－  
fits・Amer ca’s chief objectivesin the Occupation  
Were demi1itarization and democratization．Thus the  
nrst two years ofthe Occupation show a desirein  
the US for construCting a demoeratic and non－  
thr a enlng nationinAsia・The strateglCimportance  
OfJapanwasaslg ifica tconsiderationfromtheon－  
Set Ofthe occupation・JqpaJl，s geo－StrateglClocation  
PrOVides a vital，ifnot crucial，basis fbrthe whole  
EastAsianand SoutheastAsianreglOnS．Apartfrom  
thestr teglClocation，Japan’seconomicpotentialwas  
alsoimperative・InthewakeofWorldWarⅠⅠ，Japan  
1aylnru ns，along withEurope andotherAsian na－  
tions・China，the only other払rmerand potentially  
greatpowerin thereglOn，WaS agalnin acivilwar  
alongwitheconomieunderdevelopmentanddevasta－  
tionafteraprolongedwarwithJapan・Thisdoesnot  
mean thatthe US didnotfbrm other a】liancesin the  




better and faster than other nationsinthe area，and   
【」ご、・・、；・三．：ミ、「；’二：一‥き；こ亡【・：●・・●甘二巨－・・ニ・∴：：Lr・きふ【；・．打てせ  
AttheendofWorldWarII，Japan’spotentialcou－  
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beabletoassumealeadingroleinthereglOn，butat  
thesametirnehadtoberestrainedandmonitored．   
The realizationin the USin1947that the Cold  
WarwasintensifyinglS Ofgreatsignificanceforun－  
derstandingthecoursetheOccupationofJapantook．  
AsKawainotes；“［T］hedrif［ofChinatowardCorn－  
munismbecame unmistakable and the US begantO  
eonceiveofJapan，ratherthanChina，aSthenewmaT  
jorforcein the FarEastforpeace，democracy and  
friendliness towardthe US．”Z7Theinternationalset＿  
tlng PrOVided forthe recognltionthatJapan could  
betterserveaSaStrOngally・1dAtthispolnt，aStrOng  
ally meant an economical1y prosperOuS and politi－  
Callyliberal democratic and mostly stable state．  
Moreover，the US neededJapan to serve as a role  




Internationaldevelopments and poor economic  
COnditionsinJapanhastenedthe US to changethe  
COurSe Ofthe occupation．Thus began the“Reverse  
Course・”BoththeJapaneseand German economies  
needed to recover and theirindustries revived．as  
theywereconsideredthekeytothebalanceofpower  
in their respective reg10nS・2g Economic recovery  
Seemed the only way to secure these countries’re－  
glOnalrole．Both1aylnmins，but both were once  
great powers and had potemialto take on that role  
agalnandwere thusimportantto nurture within the  
AmericanideoIogy of containment policy．Conse－  
quently the USallocated resources to accelerateJaq  
Pan’s economic recovery．The”reversecourse”con－  
c6ntrated on vast economicaid andindus扇alincen＿  
tives．The chiefenglneer Ofthe reverse course was  
GeorgeEennan，WhoenvisionedJapanasthecenter－  
pleCe OfanAsianregionaleconomy・30Inthebattle  
againstCommunismintheAsianreglOn，Japan’srole  
was essential and could only be maximized through 
economic recovery and growth ratherthan slow re－  
formS and weak economy．Thus，theinternational  
Settlng，SeCunty and economic considerations coin－  
Cidedintooneclearpolicy－buildJapanintoapower－  
fu1reglOnalallywhichwouldaidAmericanreglOnal  
弧dglobalstrategleS．   
The Korean War established and rea仔irmed US，  
POlicies tow rdJapan and EastAsia．In1949，the  
State Department SOught to establish a“great cres－  
Cent”ofnationsinAsia，reaChingfromJapantoIn－  
d a・31AsstipulatedinNSC48issuedin1949，theUS  
included initsgranddesignofcontainmentdi－  
rectedagalnStthe Soviets and strovetoblockCom－  
munism，The Korean War’sinfluence was stillim＿  
POrtantinthatitconfirm dUSfbarsofacoordinated  
／ global strategy f Communist expansion・32 Thus，  
AmericanpoliciesinAsiaand towardsJapan，Were  
con員rmedandstr ngthened．Giffardwritesthat“［I］n  
termSOfs pply，loglSticsandcommunications，Japan  
WaS akey factorin deteminlngthe strategy ofthe  
United States…・and the facilities availableinJapan  
wereindispenSabletoitssuccess・＝33Japan，sstrateglC  
rolein Americanmi1itaryendeavorstocontainCom－  
munisminAsiawas ncreaslnglyviewedasessential．  
The Ko an W r accelerated the negotiations over  
the peace treatyand security treatysigned between  
the US andJapan・Americananalysts saw political  
and c nom cvalueinJapan，ratherthanJuStamili－  
tary p sition．Creatlnganalliance would signalto  
Other reg10nalnations ofa new non－threatenlngJa－  
Pa ，amOVethatwouldhelp stabilizethearea．The  
formOfa secunty treaty also helped create aJapa－  
nesedependencyon heUS，andthusreassurethere－  
glOnand e uredJapan’scooperationwiththeUSin  
otherissues．  
Japan’s po ition as a regional power resulted  
mainly from American endeavors to assist it to 
achievethiss atus・I wastheUSwhichdirectedpost  
－WarJapa intonotonlyitsdomesticnationalcharac－  
terbut lsoits reglOnalrole．CumlngS argueS thatit  
was between1947and1950that the US definedJaT   
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Par）．S rOlein world affairs，a POSition whichJapan  
heldthroughouttheColdWar・3IThisrolewasalead－  
1ng One Which，in the first years，WaS mainly based  
OnPOtentialcapabilities・Theonlynationcapableas－  
Sumlngthisleading roleinthe reglOn WaSJapan，  
Which was coupled with the US’need for a strong  
allyinthereglOninlightofinternationaleventstak－  
1ng Shapeinto a bipolarSyStem．This enforces the  
Premise ofthis study；a Superpower’s need to seL  
CurereglOnalpowersasa11iesisessential．   
Atthe endofWorld WarII，the new world order  
WaS beginnlng tO unfold and the US realizedit  
WOuld have to reconstruCt theAsian reglOn．It was  
elearthattheUS wouldnotbe ableto maintain alone  
the order in every single region. The US needed a 
StrOng，Stable and reliable ally which would prefer－  
ably shareitsideologyandthatwould acceptits re－  
glOnaldesigns and help maintainAmerican policies  
intheAsianregion．AsLaFeberstates，“［T］he US  
POlicy objective was consistent；keeplngAsiaopen  
to Americaninterests whileintegratlng the reglOn  
Within an open，global．capltalistframework．Japan  
WaSlessanendinitselfthanthemeans，inWashing－  
ton’s eyes，for achievlng thelarger reglOnaland  
globalpurposesofUSforelgnPOlicy．”35International，  
reglOnal，military and econorrlicinterests coincided  
intooneo切ective；rebuildingandstrengtheningJa－  
PanandsecunngltaS ademocracyandana11y．The  
importanCeOfJapan’srole，ratherthananyotherna－  
tio11，WaSunqueStionableonce theColdWarWaS Set  
inmotion・ByprovidingforJapan’s secunty andby  
intertwinlngitsforelgnandmi1itarypoliciesinaUST  
COntrOlled al1iance，the US tried to reassure other  
Asian nations thatJapan’s new role would help  
ratherthan threaten them．In this way，the US se－  
cured a potential regional power as an ally and 
helpedstabilizetheregionalbalanCeOfpower・Japan，  
S PaSt andfuture potentialwere the key factorsin  
SlgnalingAmerica’schoiceinitasanally．Othergeo  
－StrateglC and economicinterests，threats and strate一  
gleSWereV talintheevolutionofthealignment，but  
t efocusonJ panwasadirectresultofitspowerin  




ね mationsfrom1970，anddespitenumerous crises，  
COOP rationpersistedatal1times．Inthe1970’s，the  
a11iancewithastrongdemocraticIsraelprovedbene一  
員cial，aStheUScoulduseitsleverageoverIsraelto  
PrOmOteitsinterestsin settlingtheArab－Israelicon－  
flict．In the1980’s，CaSeS Of severe tensions were  
OVerShadow d by expanding andintensifying coop－  
erationinallareas．CorrmlOn democratic values and  
PraCticeswereakeyfactorinovercomlngCrisesand  
Stabiliz ngthe all ance．In the1990’s，PeaCein the  
MiddleEa tseemedatnrstachievable，butby2004  
hese ho es werl shattered. While supporting Israel 
a times，theUSwashighlycriticalofitsmi1itaryac－  
tions towardthe Palestinians・Israel，s reg10nalstatus  
gradual1y decreased andIsraelsufftred worldwide  
Criticismforexercislng eXCeSSive force．Yet，the US  
Stillmaintained close relations with her．Since the  
80，sth relat onsweremoreformalandinstitutional＿  
ized， Sunng COOPeration even at times of severe  
te sions・The xchangeOfinformation，militarydoc－  
trine alongside galnlngleverage overIsraelassures  
the US thatthe l1ianCe Withlsraelremains valuable．  
This tion aims to showthatinstances ofcrisis and  
COOPeration created a complexmixture ofmi1itary，  
POlitical，historical，ideologleal，mOral，andeconomic  
trade－0ff ithin theal1ianCe．Itis contended that the  
shared democracy is the underlying reason for the 
Stabilityanddurabilityofthealliance．   
OnOctober6，1973，EgyptandSyriaattackedIs－  
raelin a combined effort．At firstit seemedIsrael  
COuldfightback，butwithinafewdays，Israel’sde－  
feat was considered apossibility・LosingIsraelwas   
192  人間社会環境研究 第12号 2006．9  
COnSideredasetbacktoboth US domestic and strateT  
gicinterests，aSitwasareliablepro－WesternCOuntry  
inavialreglOn・36TheUSbeganamassiveairliftin  
responseto aSovietairlift］わrthe Arab side．37The  
1973warmadetheUSthemost山vulnerableforeign  
POWertO the war andits globalfallout，butit also  
madetheUSunlquelyqualifiedtotidyup whenthe  
ShootlngStOPPed・，描TheUShadtoassurethatIsrael  
WOuldnotcompletelyhumi1iate SadatandEgypt，in  
OrderfbrposトWarnegOtiations to succeed．39conse－  
quently，theUSmovedforcefu11ytosecureanimme－  
diate cease－fire andthe agreement withthe Soviets  
OVerthe cease－fire conditions was reflectedin UN  
resolution338．WThecease－firebrokeredwiththeSo＿  
VietswasnotreceivedfavorablybyIsrael，butIsrael  
hadtocomplywithit▲41   
Attheendofthewar．TheUSgoalsmaterialized；  
as Egypt sought42closerties with the US and was  
thus willing to make concessions．However，Israel  
emerged stronger and harder to convince．Israel’s  
newrightwing Prime Minister，Begin，PrOVed ada－  
mantinhis views，andIsrael’s strongmi1itary posi－  
tionenabledhimtoretainhisposition・43Inthiscase，  
too，the US usedIsrael’s dependency to reach an  
agreement・Inanelaboratestudy，BenZvishowsthat  
the US fbund thatin most cases where pressunng  
WaS neCeSSaryIsraelresponded wellto the carrot  
（aid）ratherthanthestiek（suspensionordelay of  
promisedaid）．44ApeaceagreemerltWaS eVentually  
reachedandsigned，andtheUSprovidedbothcoun－  




Ofits status astheleaderofthe Arab world，andthe  
Soviets were excluded from the peace process and 
th11S，MEpolitics・Israel’svitalinterestsinretainlng  
its power togetherwithits growlng eCOnOmic and  
mi1itarydependencyontheUS producedthedesired  
（bytheAmericans）concessions．Israel，sdemocratic  
Characterassuredtheseconcessionswouldbeimple－  
m nted・Wi houtthe allianCe andpromisedaid alld  
SuPPOrttOIsrael．Israelmighthaveprovedtobeeven  
harder to convince．Since the US andIsraelhad  




eviden thattheIsraeliswiftoperationwas not con－  
fined to Southern LebanOn andIsraelwentfurther  
into LebanOnlreaChedl∋eirut，and attacked Syrian  
forces．The massacre at Sabra and Shati11a aroused  
StrOnginternationalresentment．The US wasin a  
quanda y；at emPtlngSuPPOrtforaconstantlychal－  




l ableintermediaryandguarantOrintheMEwastar－  
nished・45Th  US，ambitionsand goalsinthe war  
Were COm letely sh ttered and the bombing of the  
AmericanEmbassyinBeirutPrOmPtedtheUStroops  
toleave：ま6Followlng this bombing，the American  
PreSSureOnIsra ltoevacuatethe areaescalated，and  
in May1983anIsraeli－Lebanese agreement was  
r ached，althoughnotfu71ylmPlemented・47   
This crisis presented gradually an extremely low 
POint ntherelations，butthecorefoundation ofthe  
re ationsr mainedintact．However，this strain onthe  
relat onsdidnotlastlong．For，theUS stillsawthat  
StrateglCally and politically，Israelwas an allythat  
WaSbestkeptclose．Severalmi1estonesexpandedthe  
US－Israelisecu ity ties－the1983 American－Israeli  
agreement on the establishment of a丘）rmalJoint  
Political－Military Group；the1986decision toinq  
CludeIsraelin Reagan’s SDIresearch and develop－  
mentprog am din1987anewMemorandum Of  
Und rstandi g and subsequently the Congress for－  
mally recognizedIsraelas a“m叫Or nOn－NATO  
ally・叩48Intheeconomicsphere，therelationprospered   
米国一イスラエルおよび米国一日本同盟関係の起源，耐久力および安定性の研究  193  
aswe11．h1985，theUnitedStatesandIsraelsigned  
aFreeTradeAreaAgreement：19Thiswasanimpor－  
tant agreement forIsrael，muCh dependant On the  
Americanmarket．TechnologlCalresearch and devel－  
OPment COllaboration were already formalizedin  
1977intheframeWOrkBinationalhdustrialResearch  
andDevelopment，Whichwasexpandedfurtherinthe  
80，s，50   
TheUSnotonlyshares（inthepast，thepresent  
andthefuture）generalbroadvaluesandnormSWith  




butcloserties canalso bringthe US moreleverage  
OVerIsrael．Israel，aS ademocracy，ismoretranspar－  
entinitspreftrences andtheabilitytomaintainbet－  
ter，OPenCOmmumicationwouldprovidetheUS with  
better evaluations ofIsrael’s position with regard to  
whereitis moreinsistent and where concessions can  
bemade．hthisway，theUS canexertitsinfluence  
through a calculated selection betweell coercive and 
encouraglngmeaSureSinordertopersuadeIsrael・51   
The1991GulfWarshowsthatIsraelcouldalsobe  
apossibleobstacleforthe USin achieving andpro－  
tectlngltSinterests．Inthis case，thethreatswerenot  
identical－Israelwas worried first aboutits secmity  
and the US considered the threat to the oil supply 
andworldorderasimperative．Nevertheless，theUS  
andIsraelcooperatedin thewarwiththelong tem  
Objectives ofpreservlng thebalance ofpowerinthe  
reglOn，and promotlng PeaCe and democracyln the  
area．The1990’s began with ground breaking  
achievements withPeacein the Middle East．Israel  
andmany ofitsneighboringnations were discusslng  
and reaching peace accords，withintense and active  
Arnerican support and pressure．However，by the  
middle ofthe decade，the relations hit more strains  
With anewrightwingleadershipinIsraelalld post－  
POnementOfimplementlng agreementS．The US was  
Caughtbetweenthetwosidesandwhiletryingnotto  
let the situat on deteriorate to war，Chose at the end  
r）Ot tO PreSSure either side．Desplte COnflicts over  
ong te minterests concern1ng PeaCe，StrateglC ties  
COntinuedtodevelopwithprogramS andframewofks  
for assistance and cooperation maintairIed・As Ber－  
man esc貢b s；“［I］n1996，mOrethan90American  
mi1itaryexercises，COnSistlngOfmaneuversandtrain－  
1ng dri11s conductedin conJunCtion withIDF fbrces  
andm teriel， ereheldinIsrael，includingextensive  
train ngandcoordinationbytheUSAirForce，Navy  
and Army・H52Ano her strateglC COOperation MOU  
w ssignedin1998，WhichtheUSviewedasaconfi－  
deneebuildingmeasure・53Despitedisagreementsover  
thepaceofthepeaCePrOCeSSduringthelastyearsof  
the90’ ，th rewa novisibledeclinein thelevelof  
strateglCCOOPera ion・54   
hth 鮎stfouryearsofthenewmi1lennium，USM  
Israelirelationsplungedfrom ahighpolntOfcoop－  
erat ntoanalltimelowsince1967．Fromapoint  
Ofundersta ding and sharing an objective overwar  
On terrOrism at fi st，the relations deteriorated to  
grave disagreements overIsraelimilitary aCtions．  
These endangered American regional objectives and 
thust eUSexertedmo epressureandshowsoverall  
discon en withIsra l’s policies．At the same time，  
theUScontinuedtoprovideintemationalsupportfbr  
Israel，aSWellasm 1itaryand丘nancialaid・Coopera－  
tionframeworkscon inuetothrive，instrateglCmi1i－  
tary，POliticalandeconomic丘elds．Therelationscan，  
anddocontinu toenduretheseextremelowperiods，  
stheyarehighl i s itutionalizedandbothsocieties  
Sti11shareCOmmOndemocraticpnnciplesandasil血・  
1arpoliticalvision．   
Alongsideperiod whenUS’andIsraeliobjectives  
and poli ies coincided，many times the existence of  
theallianceputtheUSinawkwardpredicaments．As  
Walts ates，Is el，“［T］hecountrythatisprobably  
mostdependentonAmerican support，isalso oneof  
themoreindependentinitsbehavior・＝55waltelabo－   
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rates and writes；“Israel’s enormous dependence on  
theUS didnotstopitfrombombing工raq，anneXlng  
the Golan HeiglltS，invading Lebanon andlaylng  
Slege tO Beirut，eXPanding settlements on the West  
Bank・・・・despltethefactthateachstepwascontraryto  
expressed US preference・＝56Thus the maintenance  
andstabilityoftherelationsmakeaninterestlngCaSe  
払ranalysIS．   
TheAmericandomestic supportforIsrael，embed－  
dedin theIsraelilobby、Can nOtfu11y explain the  
persistence of theal1iance．From the1980’s，the  
AmericanJewishcommunltyWaStranSformed丘oma  
COhesive entity unitedinits unqualined support for  
Israelinto a fractured andfragmented conununity，  
andthusitspowerdecreased・57Aspublicoplnionin  
the US generallyis favorable towardIsrael，eSPe－  
eiallylnCOmParisontoArab states．thiscanaccount  
forthedurabilityoftheal1iance．This supportis not  
Only based on historicalfactors and amnity．but  
mostly on common democratic values．The demo－  
Craticfactorisalsoimportantinmaintainlngthe sta－  
bilityofthedliaJICe・ShareddemocraticreglmeSPrO－  
videforextensivepoliticalcontacts andinstitutional  
building oftheal1iance．Sincethe1980’s there has  
beena spillover frombasic strateglC COOperation to  
many differentinteractions and communications．  
greatlycontributingtotheinstitutionalizingofdlere－  
1ations．AsSteinberg states；”［T］heinstitutionaliza－  
tionintherelationshipresultedinthe abilitytoride  
outshorttermPOlicydisagreements：，5已shareddemo－  
cratic institutions facilitate achieving compromises 
Whenconflictsarise，throughopendialogueanddis－  
cussion under different免・ameWOrks．Thus、the strate－  
gjc dimension ofthe foundation ofthe alliance ex－  
Pandedthroughmore extensive politicalinteractions  
intoinstitutionalizlng Ofthe relations，Whichin turn  
PrOVidedforthegreaterstabilitytheserelationsdem－  
OnStrate．  
、1・∴・；苧二：よ．－、∴■÷ し・uき一三・：叫・一 三こ…1こ二≒ ニー－（三lこ】；：－く：ご  
OftheA”iance  
Over time，the US－Japan alliance has broadened  
andtheUSandJapanhaveexpandedcooperationon  
Variousissues ranglngfrom secunty，the economy，  
tech ology，education to culture．The alliance has  
OVerCOmemanyCrisesandconflicts，andwasrepeat－  
edly reaffirm d and redefined，aSlessonsfrom con－  
flicts w reimplemented．Throughoutthe crises，the  
allianc  was beneficialtothe USin maintalnlng an  
impor ant dem cratic reglOnalpower as an ally．A  
CyCleoffrictionleadingtogreatercooperationframe－  
WOrks dominates the relations thro11ghout the post  
warperiod・59continulng negOtiations，COllaboration，  
CreatlngneWforumsfordiscussionandjointprq］eCtS  
r no s mply res l ofstrateglC andeconomicin－  
t restin the allia ce－better cooperationis mainly a  
result of common core democratic values in both 
COuntries．TheallianceserveSaSabasisforbroadpo－  
1i ica and economic cooperation andthe argument  
asse tsthatshareddemocracylSaneSSentialfactorin  
thedurabilityands abilityoftheal1ianCe・   
T  Vietnam War added ＄1billion toJapan’s  
GDPbecauseoftheincreaseinUSmi1itarypresence  
a tivit es．WashingtonwasaggravatedthatJapan  
reapedeconom c alnS，butwasunwillingtoassume  
anyof hewar，sburdens・60AccordingtoSchaller，the  
VietnamW rhadadramaticimpactontheUS－Japan  
relations and that overallthe relations were under－  
mined．Massive anti－American and anti－Warprotests  
inJapan compelled theJohnson administration to  
make severalconcessions onissues such as trade，  
ChinaandOkinawa．GIInthe1969Sato－Nixon Com－  
murllqu6，the return of Okinawa toJapanese sover－  
lgntyWaSagreedupo ・62NixonagreedtoreturnOk－  
nawaby1972，andevenpledgedtol・emOVenuClear  
WeaPOnSfromtheislands，Subjectto the consentto  
reintroducethemin an emergency，Which wasindi－  
rectly allowed under the revised1960 security   
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to mend the relations．Understanding the power of  
theprotestsin ademocratic reglme，theUS allowed  
for more concessions，agreelng tO returnOkinawa，  
Which was anissue highly debatedinJapan．Thus，  
COntrary tO Schaller’sargument，the relations were  
notseriouslyundeminedandcooperationpersisted，   
Thelowestpolntintherelations wereintheearly  
1970’s，WithUSunilateralactionsintheglobaleco－  
nomic systemandin openlng diplomatic relations  
With China．InJapan，the moves toward relations  
WithChinaraisedproblemsoftruStandledto ques－  
tionlngthesecuntyeostsandbenefitsoftheal1ianCe．  
Theseseverecrises，however，COntributedtoreaffirm－  
1ngthealignment and the mechanisms to broaden  
and assure cooperation，embeddedin the1978De－  
fenseGuidelines．Althoughtherelationswereconsid－  
erablyless stableinthisperiod，teminating theal1i－  
ance was notconsidered．The US’interestsin an alli－  
ance with areglOnalpower continued，eSPeCiallyin  
light ofthe economicinterdependence andthe alli－  
ance’s position as a balancerin the reglOn．Japan’s  
dependencyontheUSmadetheenduranceoftheal－  
1iance apparent desplte graVe differeIICeS and  
breaches oftruSt．Asthe foundations of the relations  
layin strateglCinterests which slowly evoIved to  
economicinterdependence，thedemocraticfactorwas  
notyetthemainstabilizlngfbrce，butitdidcontrib－  
ute・Shared views，Values and reglme Characteristics  
CanfacilitateovercomlngCrisesandmaintaingreater  
understandingoftheother’spositionandthelessons  
Ofthe crisesled tothe1978Guidelines，inanat－  
tempt to resume greater co11aboration and dialogue．  
Crises anddisputesledto expandingbilateralcoop－  
eration formal1y and trylng tO OVerCOme and avoid  
destabilizlnglnCidentsinthefuture．   
Af［erthe turbulent70，s，the1980，s wereless tur－  
b111ent but disputes persisted．As cooperation ex－  
Pandedandeconomictradeincreased，mOre areaS Of  
di agreements rfac d・Morepressurewasputonthe  
USto esoIveeconomicissues，aSmilitarycollabora－  
t onandburdensharingwasemphasized▲Japantried  
toresistboth，agreelngtOmi1dconcessions．Yet，bi－  
1ateral lationswerestableinthisperiod，aSnOneOf  
th  disputes were elevated to a crisis level. Apart 
from strateglCinterests，increased economicinterde－  
P ndenceaddedan0therinterestinmaintalnlngClose  
ties．G imes notes that，“［B］ilateraltradeandpay－  
ments imbalances have been at the core of some of 
themostconte tious episodes oftheUS－Japanrela－  
tionship，1nCluding radefrictions，eXChangeratepres－  
SureS and attempts atmacroeconomicpolicy coordi－  
nation・，，別How ver，COOPeration never ceasedand  




COnfl cts，butmostlyduetoAmericanneedandpres－  
SureforJapantOaSSumeagreatermi1itaryroleinthe  
reglOn■Japan continuously resisted this pressure，  
yieldi g very gradually・Moreover，eCOnOmicinter－  
estsandprofbu dinterdependencerequiredaframe－  
worli f r coordination between the two biggest 
economiesin the world．The alliance served as a  
mechanismto coordinate and collaborate ondifferent  
ssuesinth  economic conflict，aS Wellas secunty  
aJTangementS．Intheearly90’sthealliancewasneiT  
ther obsolete nor unstable．Incentives were foundin  
allareas forthe endurance ofthe alliance，and these  
incentives served also as reasons forriding out dis－  
Pu eS・Sharedr glme，Values，PrlnCiplesandcompat－  
iblepo ticalprocess addnot onlylntereStin main－  
t inlngthe l1iance，butserveaSaStabilizingforceas  
thesearebroaderandmorestablepreferencesthanad  
hoceconomicandsecurityinterests．  
Inth 丘rsthalfofthe90’s，disputes andlackof  
COOrdinationled bothcountries to expand dialogue   
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andcooperationforumSandrea仇mtheiral1iance．A  
SeriesofincidentsinthereglOnCauSedworryinboth  
Japan and the US；the NorthKorean nuclear crisis  
andthe1996Taiwan Stl・ait Crisis．Cases offriction  
like the Gulf War and the North Korean crisis in 
19941edtothe1996communiquさandthe1997New  
Defense Guidelines and stability was maintained・  
Bothcountrie＄realizedtheimportanceofthealliance，  
and the shared objectives specincal1yin each case  
andinthe broader sense－Of promotlng democratic  
PnnCiples・Butthedemocraticfactorwasnotmerely  
anothercommonareaforJapanandthe US．Similar  
POliticalprocessesandvaluesalsoassistinameliorat－  
1ngCOnflictandpromotlngtheresolutionofit．   
Fromthelate90’sthrough2004，areaSOfcoopera－  




the war on terrorism after9／11，COOperation ex－  
Panded and reached new heights．Economicfriction  
WaS nOt reSOIved，nOrwi11itinthe nearfuture，but  
al1disagreements are handled by dialogue and dis－  
CuSSion and compromises are attained．Democracy  
andcommonpoliticalpnnciples，aS Wellas common  
goals of promoting these values, facilitate enduring 
Challenges theinternational and domestic settlngS  
present・  
butitis d 庁icultto d fine and measure alliance costs  
andbenefitsprecisely．TheyincludenotJuStimmedi－  
atesecuritybene負tsoffinancialcosts，butoftenmore  
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